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Abstract
In AI research, mechanism design is typically used to allo-
cate tasks and resources to agents holding private informa-
tion about their values for possible allocations. In this con-
text, optimizing payments within the Groves class has re-
cently received much attention, mostly under the assump-
tion that agent’s private information is single-dimensional.
Our work tackles this problem in multi-parameter domains.
Speciﬁcally, we develop a generic technique to look for a best
Groves mechanism for any given mechanism design problem.
Our method is based on partitioning the spaces of agent val-
ues and payment functions into regions, on each of which we
are able to deﬁne a feasible linear payment function. Under
certain geometric conditions on partitions of the two spaces
this function is optimal. We illustrate our method by applying
it to the problem of allocating heterogeneous items.
Introduction
Mechanism design is concerned with problems that in-
volve multiple self-interested participants having private in-
formation about their types. In particular, it has been
widely applied to task and resource allocation scenarios,
which are fundamental to AI. A central result in mecha-
nism design is the Groves class (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971;
Groves 1973), which contains efﬁcient1, dominant-strategy
mechanisms. Mechanisms within this class are parame-
terized by the rebate function that speciﬁes the part of an
agent’s payment which is independent of his type. The
most well-known mechanism of this kind is the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG)2 mechanism that charges each agent
his externality—i.e., the amount by which his presence af-
fects the total value of the other agents.
However, while VCG is perhaps the most natural of the
Groves mechanisms, it is not always the best choice. In par-
ticular, in settings with no auctioneer, VCG payments pro-
vide a dominant-strategy implementation but noone bene-
ﬁts from the collected payments, which represent a loss in
1An mechanism is efﬁcient if it chooses the allocation that max-
imizes the sum of the values of allocated agents.
2Also referred to as the pivotal or the Clarke mechanism.
social welfare. In such cases, redistribution of VCG pay-
ments back to the agents is desirable. To this end, the
Groves mechanism that redistributes the highest possible
fraction of social welfare has been proposed in (Moulin
2009; Guo and Conitzer 2009) for the sale of identical
items. In other contexts, the question of choosing the
“best” Groves mechanism has been studied in (Bailey 1997;
Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz 2004; Cavallo 2006; Guo
and Conitzer 2010b; Gujar and Narahari 2011; Guo 2011;
2012) for various models and objectives.
Generally, a mechanism design problem is speciﬁed by
an objective function (e.g., welfare-maximization, fairness,
or revenue-maximization) and constraints (e.g., individual
rationality3 or weak budget balance4). Our goal is to ﬁnd a
mechanism within the Groves class that optimizes the given
objective under the given constraints. Let v 2 V = n be
a type proﬁle, where  denotes the space of types for each
of n agents. The vector v i 2 n 1 stands for types of the
agents other than i, and the space W = n 1 of all vectors
v i is the same for each i. Mechanisms within the Groves
class differ from one another by the part of an agent’s pay-
ment that is independent of his type, which is speciﬁed by a
rebate function h : W ! R. Thereby, the problem of ﬁnd-
ing a best Groves mechanism for a given mechanism design
problem can be expressed as an optimization problem:5;6
maximizeh:W!R objective value s.t. 8 v 2 V (1)
objective value is achieved
constraints hold
To date, however, most of the literature on optimal Groves
mechanisms was devoted to single-parameter domains
3A mechanism is individually rational if each agent is never
worse off after participating in the mechanism.
4A mechanism is weakly budget-balanced if the total amount of
payments made by the agents is non-negative.
5We refer the reader to Section 3 of (Naroditskiy, Polukarov,
andJennings2012)forasingle-parameterexampleofamechanism
design problem modeled this way.
6Some combinations of constraints (e.g., weak budget balance
and 2-fairness) may be impossible to implement: this is identiﬁed
by the lack of a feasible solution to the optimization problem.where an agent’s private information is characterized by a
single number (i.e.,   R). While these models are ap-
plicable to many important domains (e.g., public good and
allocation of homogeneous items), they do not capture many
other scenarios of practical interest such as allocation of het-
erogeneous items or public choice with several alternatives.
Therefore, optimization within the Groves class for multi-
parameter types is an important task.
In this direction, there has been comparatively little work.
In particular, Gujar and Narahari (2011) present a conjec-
ture about an optimal mechanism for allocation of heteroge-
neous items to agents with unit demand, which Guo (2012)
proves correct; Cavallo (2006) gives a widely applica-
ble, but not necessarily optimal mechanism, and Guo and
Conitzer (2009) ﬁnd an optimal mechanism for the allo-
cation of homogeneous items among agents desiring mul-
tiple copies. More recently, Guo (2011) studied welfare-
maximizing Groves mechanisms in a combinatorial auction
setting and derived a number of results for allocation of het-
erogeneous items. In all these examples, agent types are
represented by m-dimensional vectors, that is   R
m for
some m 2 N. However, each of these papers studies a spe-
ciﬁc scenario.
In contrast, our work is in the spirit of automated mech-
anism design (Conitzer and Sandholm 2002; Guo and
Conitzer 2010a): we develop a generic technique that takes
a mechanism design problem as an input and searches for
an optimal Groves mechanism for the problem. The same
technique can be applied to any of the problems often avoid-
ing the need for custom-made solutions for each problem.
Note that this generic optimization problem (1) cannot be
solved directly: optimization is over functions and there is
aninﬁnitenumberofconstraints. Nonetheless, thetechnique
we propose makes it possible to tackle such problems effec-
tively.
Speciﬁcally, we design an algorithm for multi-parameter
domains, that allows optimization over Groves mechanisms
by considering various subclasses of rebate functions. In
more detail, each of these subclasses is associated with a
subdivision7 of the rebate space W (i.e., the domain of the
rebate function) such that all rebate functions in the subclass
are linear on each region of the subdivision. Given such
a subdivision, we construct a linear program that ﬁnds the
rebate function, which is optimal within its corresponding
subclass. These rebates satisfy the constraints of a given
mechanism design problem (1), and thus provide a lower
bound on its objective. Importantly, the quality of the solu-
tion achieved depends on the choice of the subclass. That is,
by initializing the process with different subdivisions, one
can be guided in the direction of ﬁnding the subdivision that
yields an optimal rebate function. The distance between the
lower bound and the optimal solution can be measured by
comparing the current objective value to an upper bound,
which can be computed with another algorithm that we pro-
vide. If the bounds coincide, we have found the optimal
rebate function.
7A subdivision (or, partition) of a space is a collection of its
disjoint subsets (or, regions), whose union covers the entire space.
Our results build upon and signiﬁcantly extend a tech-
nique for ﬁnding optimal rebate functions in single-
parameter domains (Naroditskiy, Polukarov, and Jennings
2012). This previous technique reduces the problem of ﬁnd-
ing optimal rebates to identifying consistent partitions of the
rebate space and the space of agent values. Unfortunately,
consistent partitions are sometimes difﬁcult to identify. To
this end, this paper provides a heuristic for ﬁnding (not nec-
essarily optimal) rebate functions when such partitions are
not available. We would like to remark that the results we
present do not require ﬁnding consistent partitions. How-
ever, if such partitions are available, our method will pro-
duce an optimal rebate function.
We illustrate our method on the problem of welfare-
maximizing allocation of heterogeneous items under the
constraints of weak budget balance, and individual rational-
ity. Our analysis explains existing mechanisms in terms of
subdivisions of the rebate space they induce. We describe
the subdivision on which VCG rebates are linear, and then
show how it is reﬁned to deﬁne the Bailey/Cavallo mecha-
nism (Bailey 1997; Cavallo 2006), and then further reﬁned
for the HETERO (Gujar and Narahari 2011) mechanism. Fi-
nally, the negative result in (Gujar and Narahari 2011) fol-
lows easily from this geometric perspective: using a single
region in the rebate space, the best linear rebate function
yields zero welfare in the worst case.
Concisely, our work extends the state of the art as follows:
 We propose a methodology to optimize payments in
Groves mechanisms that is not problem-speciﬁc and can
be applied to any problem. This is the ﬁrst general tech-
nique for multi-parameter domains.
 For both single- and multi-parameter domains, this is the
ﬁrst technique that provides feasible (i.e., satisfying all
of the given constraints) mechanisms, regardless of the
availability of consistent partitions. In cases where such
partitions are known, optimal solutions are guaranteed.
 Our method gives a unifying geometric perspective for
understanding results developed by other authors for spe-
ciﬁc problems.
The paper unfolds as follows. We ﬁrst present the formal
model of multi-parameter domains, and cover preliminar-
ies. Speciﬁcally, we provide all necessary deﬁnitions from
polyhedral geometry and generalize the concept of consis-
tent subdivisions to multi-parameter domains. In the follow-
ing section, we introduce our main contribution, which is a
heuristic technique for ﬁnding payment functions for cases
with no (known) consistent partitions. We then apply the
technique to allocation of heterogeneous items, before our
conclusions and future work.
Multi-Parameter Domains
We consider multi-parameter domains where n agents par-
ticipate in a mechanism choosing a social outcome k 2 K.
The type of agent i is given by an m-dimensional vector
vi 2 [0;1]m, where v
j
i denotes the value agent i gets ina publicly known subset of outcomes K
j
i  K.8 We use
V = [0;1]nm to denote the value space. In the case of allo-
cating m heterogeneous items to agents with unit-demand,
v
j
i denotes the value agent i derives from owning item j,
and K
j
i is the set of all outcomes where agent i is allocated
item j. The model also applies to non-allocation scenarios
such as public project with multiple alternatives, where par-
ticipants need to decide which one of m possible projects
to undertake. There v
j
i denotes how much agent i values
project j and K
j
i is the outcome undertaking project j (in
this case, K
j
1 = ::: = Kj
n). Obviously, single-parameter
domains are a special case obtained by setting m = 1.
We make the standard assumption of utilities linear in
money and denote payments by t : V ! Rn, where
ti(v) 2 R is the payment collected from agent i given value
proﬁle v. We focus on Groves mechanisms, thus ﬁxing the
allocation function to choose the efﬁcient1 allocation, de-
noted by f(v). In a slight abuse of notation, we use vi(k) to
denote the value of agent i under the outcome k. Payments
under a Groves mechanism are set according to the rule
ti(v) = hi(v i)  
P
j6=i vj(f(v)) where hi : W ! R is
an arbitrary function that only depends on values of the other
agents v i 2 W = [0;1]m(n 1), with W dubbed the rebate
space. We will refer to the expression
P
j6=i vj(f(v)) in
the payment function as the Groves payment and to hi as the
rebate function. Apt et al. (2008) show that the restriction to
anonymous rebate functions h : W ! R is without loss of
generality. Thus, mechanisms within the Groves class differ
only in the function h.
In this work we design a generic method to optimize the
rebate function. That is, we take as an input a mechanism
design problem in the form of equation (1) and search for
the best Groves mechanism for it. Recall that the optimiza-
tion problem (1) cannot be solved directly: we need to opti-
mize over functions, with an inﬁnite number of constraints.
Therefore, to overcome these difﬁculties, we partition the
value and the rebate spaces in a certain way and consider
subclasses of rebate functions associated with these parti-
tions. In the next section we cover the necessary preliminary
results, before introducing consistent partitions, which give
the basis for our method.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the notation and preliminar-
ies necessary for presentation of our main results in follow-
ing sections. In particular, we provide relevant concepts and
deﬁnitions from polyhedral geometry that are needed to ex-
tend the results on consistent partitions from (Naroditskiy,
Polukarov, and Jennings 2012) to multi-parameter domains.
In particular, we deﬁne a d-dimensional polytope, p, as a
convex hull of a ﬁnite set of points in the Euclidean space.
Equivalently, we can deﬁne it as a ﬁnite intersection of half-
spaces: p = fx 2 Rd j Ax  bg, where A 2 Rsd, b 2 Rs,
and s is the number of halfspaces. Thus, a pair (A;b) de-
8This notation is a natural generalization of the single-
parameter domain deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 9.33) in (Nisan 2007).
notes the corresponding polytope. For any p, let the relative
interior, relint(p), denote the polytope without its facets.
Deﬁnition 1 A set PX of polytopes is a subdivision (equiv-
alently, a partition) of the polytope X if the polytopes PX do
not overlap: relint(p) \ relint(q) = ?; 8 p;q 2 PX, and
cover exactly the polytope X:
S
p2PX p = X.
Each polytope p 2 PX deﬁnes a region of the partitioned
space X. We will subdivide the value space V and the rebate
space W so that the allocation function is constant on each
region of PV and the rebate function is linear on each region
of PW. In order to be able to deﬁne such piecewise linear
rebates, which will be feasible for a given mechanism design
problem, we will require these subdivisions to satisfy some
consistency conditions (to be deﬁned) w.r.t. the regions of
both subdivisions and their extreme points (or, vertices).
We proceed to introduce some additional concepts neces-
sary for deﬁning the consistency conditions for PV and PW.
Deﬁnition 2 A subdivision PX reﬁnes a subdivision P0
X if
for each p 2 PX there is a p0 2 P0
X j p  p0.
The above deﬁnition extends to reﬁnements of sets of poly-
topes that are not necessarily subdivisions, as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 A subdivision PX of the polytope X reﬁnes a
polytope q if for all p 2 PX the intersection with q is either
empty or p: relint(p) \ relint(q) = ? _ p \ q = p. A
subdivision PX reﬁnes a set of polytopes Q if PX reﬁnes all
polytopes q 2 Q.
RecallthatGrovesmechanismsallocatetheitemsefﬁciently.
That is, the sum of values of the allocated agents for the
items is maximal among all possible allocations. Thus, a
region of the value space on which the allocation function
is constant (e.g., agent 1 is allocated item 1, agent 2—item
2, ..., and agent m—item m) is given by the intersection of
halfspaces as deﬁned by the inequalities indicating that the
value of a particular allocation (e.g., v1
1 + v2
2 + ::: + vm
m)
is greater than the value of any other allocation. Thereby,
allocation regions induce a subdivision of the value space.
We denote this initial subdivision by PI
V .
Note that all typical constraints (e.g., individual rational
and weak budget balance) are linear in Groves payments and
rebates throughout each of these regions,9 and thus can be
represented with coefﬁcients  2 Rnm,  2 Rn and 0 2 R
as follows:
n X
i=1
m X
j=1

j
iv
j
i +
n X
i=1
ih(v i)  0 (2)
We are going to exploit linearity of constraints throughout
each region in the value space, referred to as a value region.
To this end, we require the ﬁnal subdivision PV of the value
space to reﬁne PI
V . In fact, given a subdivision of the rebate
space, on which the rebate function is linear, we may need to
reﬁne the initial subdivision in order to guarantee that each
agent’s rebate is linear throughout a value region. This will
allow the constraints in (2) to be represented by coefﬁcients
9See Section 3 in (Naroditskiy, Polukarov, and Jennings 2012)
for an example illustrating this linearity. 2 Rnm+1 throughout each value region:
n X
i=1
m X
j=1

j
iv
j
i  0 (3)
The following deﬁnitions help us describe such regions.
Deﬁnition 4 Lifting of a subdivision PW from W to V is a
set of polytopes in V
lift(PW) =
[
(A;b)2PW
n [
i=1
(Av i  b) \ V
Deﬁnition 5 (Region consistency) Subdivisions PV , PW
are region-consistent if PV reﬁnes the polytopes lift(PW).
Region consistency is a geometric encoding of the property
that for each region q 2 PV and for each agent i, the rebate
for this agent is given by the same rebate function hp for
all v 2 q, where p 2 PW (see Lemma 2 in (Naroditskiy,
Polukarov, and Jennings 2012)).
Next we turn to the vertex consistency condition. The set
of the extreme points of the polytopes in subdivision PX is
denoted by ^ PX.
Deﬁnition 6 Given a subdivision PV , the projection of its
extreme points ^ PV on W is
W( ^ PV ) =
[
v2 ^ PV
n [
i=1
v i
Deﬁnition 7 (Vertex consistency) Subdivisions PV and
PW are vertex-consistent if the projection of the extreme
points of PV is the extreme points of PW
W( ^ PV ) = ^ PW
Armed with the deﬁnitions above, we are ready to present
our results in the next two sections.
Consistent Partitions
In (Naroditskiy, Polukarov, and Jennings 2012), the au-
thors showed for single-parameter domains that region- and
vertex-consistency, coupled with some additional conditions
on PV and PW collectively called consistent partitions, im-
ply the existence of rebates that are linear on each region
of PW and are optimal for the mechanism design problem
being solved.
Deﬁnition 8 For a given initial partition PI
V , partitions PV
and PW are consistent if: (i) PV reﬁnes PI
V ; (ii) PV and PW
are region- and vertex-consistent; and (iii) each polytope in
PW has (n   1)m + 1 extreme points.
This deﬁnition generalizes consistent partitions from (Nar-
oditskiy, Polukarov, and Jennings 2012) to multi-parameter
domains. The only difference in deﬁnitions is in the num-
ber of extreme points in condition (iii): in the (n   1)m-
dimensional W space, (n   1)m + 1 points deﬁne a linear
function.
Before showing how consistent partitions can be used to
ﬁnd optimal rebate functions, we need additional notation.
Suppose the set of values is not the inﬁnite set V , but a ﬁnite
subset ^ V  V . When we look for optimal rebates assuming
the set of value proﬁles is ﬁnite, we speak of the restricted
problem. In fact, the restricted problem is a linear program,
which can be solved to obtain an optimal solution as we for-
mally deﬁne in Figure 1. Notice that in a restricted problem
we are looking for a ﬁnite number of rebates (one for each
element in W(^ V )) rather than for rebate functions.
As Theorem 1 below shows, we can use consistent subdi-
visions with the restricted problem to ﬁnd optimal rebates.
Algorithm RestrictedProblem
Input: set of proﬁles ^ V
Output: payment values ^ h on W(^ V ) and upper bound obj
/** solve a linear program **/
maxobj2R; ^ h2Rj ^ V j obj s.t. 8 v 2 ^ PV
constraints(v;^ h(v 1);:::;^ h(v n))
return ( ^ w;obj)
Figure 1: LP for an upper bound.
Theorem 1 Let PV and PW denote consistent subdivisions
for a mechanism design problem with an allocation function
inducing the initial partition PI
V . Let f^ h(w) j w 2 ^ PWg
denote the set of rebates from an optimal solution to the re-
stricted problem, which only considers proﬁles ^ PV . Further,
let ^ p denote the set of (n   1)m + 1 extreme points of a
polytope p 2 PW. For each polytope, deﬁne a linear re-
bate function hp(w) =
P(n 1)m
i=1 a
p
iwi+bp with coefﬁcients
ap 2 R(n 1)m;bp 2 R given by a solution to the system of
linear equations f^ h(w) =
P(n 1)m
i=1 a
p
iwi + bp j w 2 ^ pg.
Then, the following rebate function is optimal for the mech-
anism design problem: for w 2 p, h(w) = hp(w).
Proof The proof is a straightforward generalization of the
proof of Theorem 2 in (Naroditskiy, Polukarov, and Jen-
nings 2012). Property (i) of Deﬁnition 8 ensures that the
constraints on a value region q 2 PV are of the form given
in Equation (2). Further, property (ii) guarantees that if h is
linear on PW, then the constraints can be represented by lin-
ear coefﬁcients as shown in Equation (3). We can construct
a linear function hp by interpolating the extreme points as in
(n   1)m dimensions, (n   1)m + 1 linearly independent
points deﬁne a linear function (if some of them are depen-
dent, they deﬁne a family of functions). Thus, for a region p
with(n 1)m+1extremepoints(propertyiii), thereexistsat
least one linear function hp(w) =
P(n 1)m
i=1 a
p
iwi +bp with
ap 2 R(n 1)m;bp 2 R given by a solution to the system of
linear equations f^ h(w) =
P(n 1)m
i=1 a
p
iwi + bp j w 2 ^ pg.
By construction, h(w) is linear on PW and the constraints
hold at the extreme points of each q 2 PV . It is an easy ob-
servation that a linear constraint holds at the extreme points
of a polytope if and only if it holds on the entire polytope,
and thus h(v i) satisﬁes the constraints at all points v 2 q
for each q. That is, a solution to the restricted problem that
only includes constraints for extreme points of PV is feasi-ble in the original problem, i.e. the constraints are satisﬁed
for each v 2 V . As the objective function in (1) is rep-
resented by a constraint, and the objective value of the re-
stricted problem (i.e., the upper bound) is achieved for all
v 2 V , the rebate function h(w) is optimal. 
Note that Theorem 1 provides a constructive proof of the ex-
istence of a piecewise linear optimal solution for any mecha-
nismdesignproblemthatadmitsconsistentpartitions. Given
such partitions PV and PW, one just needs to solve the re-
stricted problem over the set of extreme points ^ PV and then
deﬁne a linear rebate function for each rebate region by lin-
early interpolating optimal rebates at its extreme points. It
is therefore important to identify settings that admit such
partitions. A special case of consistent partitions for multi-
parameter domains has been studied in (Guo and Conitzer
2010b). There, “order-consistent” classes correspond to
consistent subdivisions where the value and rebate spaces
are subdivided with hyperplanes of the form xi = xj for
each pair of coordinates (i;j).10
However, for many problems it is not clear how to ﬁnd
consistent partitions or, indeed, whether they exist at all. In
this paper, we provide a procedure that computes heuristic
solutions to mechanism design problems where consistent
partitions are not available.
The Heuristic Technique
In this section, we present our main result: a technique for
ﬁnding and evaluating solutions by solving linear programs.
All of the results in this section are novel for both single and
multi-parameter domains. Our approach builds upon the fol-
lowing observation. While it may be difﬁcult to ﬁnd parti-
tions that are both region- and vertex-consistent, we notice
that region-consistency alone holds for any PW and PV that
reﬁnes lift(PW). As before, to preserve linearity of con-
straints on each region of a partition PV , we require PV to
reﬁne the initial partition PI
V as deﬁned by the allocation
function. To deﬁne such a partition, we need the following
notation.
Deﬁnition 9 Given subdivisions PX and P0
X of a polytope
X, their intersection is the set of polyhedra
fp \ p0gp2PX; p02P 0
X; relint(p)\relint(p0)6=?
Intuitively, an intersection is obtained by placing one subdi-
vision on top of the other. Importantly, as we show below,
intersecting subdivisions produce a new subdivision.
Lemma 1 The intersection of subdivisions is a subdivision.
Proof By construction, the resulting set of polyhedra de-
ﬁnes non-overlapping regions that cover the entire polytope.
All that we need to show is that these regions are convex
(i.e., polytopes). This follows immediately from the fact that
each region is given by the intersection of convex regions,
which itself is convex. 
10An interested reader is referred to Chapter 6.3.2 in (De Loera,
Rambau, and Santos 2010) for more details on such triangulations
of hypercubes.
A minimal partition that reﬁnes both PI
V and lift(PW) is
their intersection. Note however that lift(PW) is not nec-
essarily a subdivision of the value space but a collection of
possibly overlapping polytopes covering V , and so deﬁni-
tion 9 is not directly applicable. A natural way to overcome
this problem is to replace lift(PW) with the collection of
(disjoint) polyhedra that is induced by the facets of the poly-
topes lift(PW). Yet, for this collection to deﬁne a subdivi-
sion of V , the polyhedra must be convex. The next lemma
shows this is indeed the case.
Lemma 2 For a subdivision PW of the rebate space, the
linear constraints of the polytopes lift(PW) deﬁne a subdi-
vision of the value space.
Proof First note that the polytopes lift(PW) cover the poly-
tope V : any point v 2 V belongs to the lifted polytopes
fp 2 PW j v i 2 pgn
i=1. Thus, the constraints of the
polytopes lift(PW) subdivide V into polyhedra. We need
to prove that each polyhedron is a polytope (i.e., convex).
By construction, each boundary between adjacent regions
(polyhedra) from lift(PW) corresponds to a boundary in PW
for some i. Crossing a region boundary in V corresponds
to crossing a boundary in PW. Suppose that V contains a
non-convex region q. Then one can cross a boundary while
following an interval that starts and ends in q: for some  2
(0;1), there must exist v0;v 2 q j v = v0+(1 )v = 2 q.
Denote the region11 and the lifting dimension that generated
the boundary by p 2 PW and i. By construction of q, the re-
bate for agent i comes from the same rebate region through-
out the q region: v i j v 2 relint(q)  p for some unique
p 2 PW. In particular, v0
 i and v
 i belong to the same re-
gion p 2 PW. Now, since p is convex, v i must also belong
to p, which is impossible since we crossed the boundary. 
By Lemmas 1 and 2, given a subdivision of the rebate space
PW, we can deﬁne a subdivision PV of the value space
as the intersection of the initial partition PI
V and the set of
polytopes as induced by the constraints of lift(PW). More-
over, as the following lemma shows, we can further inter-
sect region-consistent partitions, while preserving region-
consistency.
Lemma 3 Let P
V be region-consistent with P
W and P0
V
region-consistent with P0
W. The subdivisions PV and PW
given by the intersection of P
V with P0
V and P
W with P0
W
are region-consistent.
Proof We need to argue that all region boundaries of
lift(PW) are used to deﬁne PV . But this is immediate as
the only boundaries of PW are the ones from P
W and P0
W,
and by consistency of P
V , P
W and P0
V , P0
W, the boundaries
lift(P
W) and lift(P0
W) are present in PV . 
We use the lemmas above in the derivation of our main
result in Theorem 2. Intuitively, we choose a subdivision
of the rebate space and ﬁnd rebate functions that are opti-
mal among linear rebates on this subdivision. The objective
value achieved by this mechanism provides a lower bound
11There may be multiple such regions, in which case apply the
proof to each of them, and there will be at least one that will lead
us to a contradiction.on the true objective value. The performance of the rebate
functioncanbeevaluatedagainstanupperboundthatweob-
tain by solving the restricted problem with a ﬁnite number
of proﬁles presented in Figure 1. If these two bounds match,
the mechanism is optimal, otherwise the gap indicates how
suboptimal the mechanism may be. A large gap is an indica-
tion that one of the bounds should be improved, which can
be done as we discuss next.
These upper and lower bound procedures provide a com-
putational way of searching for good payment functions.
The selected subdivision of the rebate space determines the
efﬁcacy of the rebate function produced in the lower bound
LP, so we can try different subdivisions in search for the
highest lower bound. Similarly, the choice of value proﬁles
determines the tightness of the upper bound, so we can plug
in different subsets of proﬁles in search for the lowest upper
bound.
Heuristic Rebates (Lower Bound)
For any subdivision PW, we present a technique for ﬁnd-
ing a feasible rebate function that is optimal among rebate
functions linear on PW. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst ﬁnd a subdi-
vision of the value space PV as the intersection of PI
V and
lift(PW). Then we deﬁne a linear program that (like the re-
stricted problem in Figure 1) includes constraints only for
the extreme points of PV , and also enforces linearity of re-
bates on the regions of PW. The resulting linear program
is stated in Figure 2. The variables are the rebates ^ h for the
extreme points ^ PV and the coefﬁcients ap 2 R(n 1)m+1
deﬁning a linear rebate function on each region p 2 PW. As
we show, an optimal solution (in fact, any feasible solution)
to this linear program is a feasible solution in the original
problem.12
Algorithm LinearRebates
Input: initial subdivision P
I
V , subdivision PW
Output: rebate function h and the objective value obj
PV - intersection of lift(PW) and P
I
V
/** solve a linear program **/
max
obj2R; ^ h2RjW ( ^ PV )j; a2RjPW j((n 1)m+1) obj
s.t. constraints(v;^ h(v 1);:::;^ h(v n)) 8 v 2 ^ PV
^ h(w) =
P(n 1)m
i=1 a
p
iw + a
p
(n 1)m+1 8p 2 PW; w 2 ^ p
/** coefﬁcients a deﬁne a rebate function linear on PW **/
h(w) = f
P(n 1)m
i=1 a
p
iw + a
p
(n 1)m+1gp2PW
return (h(w);obj)
Figure 2: LP for a lower bound.
Theorem 2 (Main Result) Given a rebate space subdivi-
sion PW and an initial subdivision PI
V of the value space,
12It is possible that the LinearRebates LP does not have
a feasible solution. This may be caused by the linearity restric-
tion, in which case trying a different PW may result in a feasible
solution. Or, the original problem may not have a feasible solu-
tion. The latter case can often be conﬁrmed by observing that the
RestrictedProblem LP has no feasible solution for some ^ V .
the algorithm LinearRebates(PW;PI
V ) ﬁnds a feasible
rebate function.
Proof Recall that PV is constructed by placing the poly-
topes lift(PW) on top of the subdivision PI
V . By Lemmas 1
and 2, this results in a valid subdivision of V that reﬁnes
both lift(PW) and PI
V . Hence, PV and PW are region con-
sistent, and for any q 2 PV , the rebate for agent i is given
by the same rebate function hp for all v 2 q. Again, by
construction the rebate function is linear on each p 2 PW:
the linearity constraints are enforced explicitly in Figure 2.
Combining this with the fact that PV reﬁnes PI
V , we get that
the constraints are linear on each region v 2 q: i.e., can be
represented with a set of coefﬁcients  as in (3). The con-
straints are satisﬁed at the extreme points of each q 2 PV
and are linear throughout q. Thus, they are satisﬁed for at all
v 2 q and the rebate function is feasible. 
The rebates found byLinearRebates(PW;PI
V ) are opti-
mal for a restricted class of solutions, thus providing a lower
bound on the objective value.
Upper Bound on the Objective Value
The solution to LinearRebates provides a feasible re-
bate function and the objective value achieved with this
function. This value provides a lower bound on the optimal
objective value. Obviously, the quality of this bound de-
pends on the choice of partition PW of the rebate space. We
can check the quality of a solution by comparing its lower
bound to an upper bound, which we can obtain by ﬁnding
optimal rebates for a ﬁnite set of proﬁles ^ V  V using the
RestrictedProblem algorithm in Figure 1. A natural
choice for ^ V is the set of extreme points of the subdivision
PV considered in LinearRebates.
We can consider different sets of proﬁles ^ V  V in the
search for the lowest upper bound. Similarly, we can try dif-
ferent PW to search for the rebate function with the highest
lower bound. The rebate function is optimal if the highest
lower bound coincides with the lowest upper bound. Note,
that whenever consistent partitions PV and PW are avail-
able, LinearRebates provides an optimal solution when
supplied with PW.
Example: Heterogeneous Item Allocation
We apply our technique to item allocation among n agents
with unit demand, who compete for m < n heterogeneous
items. Each agent (weakly) desires the items, and evaluates
eachitem independentlyofthe otheritemsandagents. Thus,
an agent’s valuation for the m items is represented by an m-
dimensional, non-negative vector, where the jth component
speciﬁes the value the agent gets from being allocated item
j. We evaluate the performance of a mechanism by the so-
cial welfare it guarantees, which is the minimum fraction of
the value of the efﬁcient allocation it provides, for all value
proﬁles. The goal is to ﬁnd a Groves mechanism that max-
imizes this worst-case social welfare, while satisfying con-
straints of weak budget balance (i.e., the total amount redis-
tributed does not exceed the total price paid by the allocated
agents), and individual rationality (i.e., utility of each agent
is nonnegative).Theorem 2 states that in order to ﬁnd a feasible rebate
function using LinearRebates, we need to determine
the initial subdivision PI
V , deﬁning regions where the allo-
cation is ﬁxed. This subdivision is given by a set of linear
inequalities, comparing the values of all pairs of allocations.
We also need a rebate space subdivision for the rebate func-
tion, which we base on allocation subdivisions for subsets
of agents, as a natural extension from previous work. If s is
a subset of agents, then deﬁne PV (s) as the allocation sub-
division for agents in s. Further, let P
y
V be the intersection
of PV (s) for all y-sized subsets s  N. Deﬁne PW(s) and
P
y
W similarly.
Theorem 3 SubdivisionsP
y
V andP
y
W areregion-consistent.
Proof We need to show that the region boundaries of the
polytopes lift(P
y
W) are in P
y
V . By construction, a polytope
(Aw  b) 2 PW(s) determines the allocation among agents
s, jsj = y. Let S refer to the indexes of the agents included
in this subset. Lifting the polytope for any agent i, we obtain
Av i  b. But Av i  b speciﬁes an allocation region for
y agents with the following indexes
S
0(j) =
(
S(j) if S(j) < i
S(j) + 1 if S(j)  i
This region is part of the subdivision P
y
V as, by construction,
it includes allocation regions for all subsets of size y. 
Let P
j;k
V denote the intersection of subdivisions P
y
V for
j  y  k and deﬁne P
j;k
W analogously. By Lemma 3, the
subdivisions P
j;k
V and P
j;k
W are region-consistent. Such sub-
divisionsareinducedbytheexistingmechanismswe discuss
below.
Designing a mechanism by choosing the rebate space par-
tition gives a geometric perspective on the process of ﬁnding
an optimal mechanism. While searching for an appropri-
ate subdivision, we can tie together previous results for this
problem under this subdivision analysis.
First, VCG rebates involve the value of the efﬁcient al-
location f(v i), for each i 2 N. Within each region of
P
n 1
W , the allocation of the agents in w = v i stays con-
stant, so the subdivisions of P
n 1
W deﬁne the regions of lin-
earity for VCG rebates. The Bailey/Cavallo mechanism de-
ﬁnes the rebate function to be the average sum of the VCG
payments made in the market with n   1 agents with values
w. An agent’s rebate depends on the value of the efﬁcient al-
locationforalln 1agentstodetermineeachagent’sGroves
payment, which will be linear within regions of P
n 1
W . The
VCG rebates of each of the (n 1) agents depend on the efﬁ-
cient allocation for each subset of (n 2) agents (excluding
each agent from w in turn). The subdivision P
n 2
W ensures
each subset of size (n   2) has a ﬁxed allocation within a
region. Combining these, an agent’s rebate function for the
Bailey/Cavallo mechanism is linear in regions of P
n 2;n 1
W .
The process of subdividing the rebate space can natu-
rally continue to include subdivisions into allocation regions
among n   3 agents P
n 3;n 1
W , n   4 agents P
n 4;n 1
W ,
etc. Adding extra subdivisions does not hurt the optimality
of the mechanism, but it will lead to unnecessary complex-
ity (both in the LPs of our technique and in the produced
mechanism) without improving the objective value. The
optimal mechanism for homogeneous items (Moulin 2009;
Guo and Conitzer 2009) has rebates that are linear when the
set and order of the lowest (n   m   2) agents is ﬁxed,
and this occurs within regions of P
m;n 1
W . This subdivision
also deﬁnes regions where the HETERO mechanism deﬁned
in (Gujar and Narahari 2011) has linear rebates.
We ran our heuristic technique to ﬁnd the optimal mecha-
nism for allocating 2 heterogeneous items to 4 agents, us-
ing rebates linear in P
(2;3)
W . Using this subdivision, our
lower bound LP produced a mechanism with a worst-case
ratio of 1
4, which is the best achievable for the allocation
of 2 homogeneous items among 4 agents (Moulin 2009;
Guo and Conitzer 2009).
Conclusions
Groves mechanisms are a powerful tool in mechanism de-
sign as they are the class of efﬁcient, dominant-strategy
mechanisms. While there has been much work on ﬁnding
optimal Groves mechanisms, it usually focused on single-
parameter domains. In contrast, multi-parameter domains
are not well understood, neither in terms of characterization
of implementable mechanisms, nor in terms of the extant re-
sults on optimal payment functions. Our focus on Groves
mechanisms stems from the fact that no other characteri-
zation exists for multi-parameter domains. Given this, our
work is the ﬁrst step in optimization of general dominant-
strategy mechanisms for multi-parameter domains.
We presented a technique for ﬁnding optimal Groves
mechanisms in multi-parameter domains. This built upon
results on consistent partitions in single-parameter do-
mains (Naroditskiy, Polukarov, and Jennings 2012). Consis-
tent partitions of the agents’ value space and the rebate space
provide optimal rebates. However, consistent partitions may
be hard or impossible to ﬁnd. To this end, we introduced
a heuristic technique to ﬁnd the best rebate function when
consistent partitions do not exist or are not known. This pro-
cedure consists of a lower bound and an upper bound lin-
ear programs. The lower bound LP produces optimal piece-
wise linear rebates for the given rebate space partitioning,
which may not necessarily be globally optimal. However,
the achievable global optimal objective value can be upper
bounded using the upper bound LP. To demonstrate our pro-
cedure, we applied it to the problem of allocating heteroge-
neous items to agents with unit demand while maximizing
social welfare.
One concern may be that the LinearRebates and
RestrictedProblem linear programs can be quite com-
putationally intensive to solve. Indeed, we observed that op-
timal piecewise linear functions require an exponential num-
ber of regions, making the complexity unavoidable if we are
after an optimal solution. However, this computation needs
to be performed only once to derive rebate functions. The
output of the computation is an analytical solution: a rebate
function that can be written down. This rebate function can
then be used for any reports of agent values without any ad-
ditional computation.
In future work, this technique could also be used to lookfor optimal rebates in combinatorial auctions. Moreover, so-
cial welfare is just one objective that can be maximized us-
ing the approach we presented. Alternatively, our approach
can be applied to optimize fairness. Apart from the search
for optimal solutions, the technique can be used to search for
simple solutions with good performance. In particular, we
can investigate the tradeoff between rebate function com-
plexity and solution quality by varying the complexity of
the partitioning of the rebate space when ﬁnding heuristic
solutions. Since solving the linear programs can be com-
putationally difﬁcult, future work can experimentally eval-
uate the time required to ﬁnd the rebate function. Finally,
our technique can be used to optimize rebates in non-Groves
mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, in single-parameter domains, one
can apply the technique to non-efﬁcient mechanisms that are
dominant-strategy implementable.
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